U.S. Long-Term Yield Rebound: Why Nasdaq Duration Risk Is Not Over Yet [EN]
* The original Korean post is available here. -> Korean Version
"The renewed rise in long-term yields is not merely a problem for technology stocks. When the discount rate rises, every asset has to recalculate its price. Nasdaq only shakes first; the pressure spreads across all industries."
— System View Macroeconomic Framework
[System View Quick Take]
The renewed rise in U.S. long-term yields is not simply a bond-market event.
A 10-year yield around 4.5% and a 30-year yield around 5% mark a zone where the discount rate for the entire equity market must be recalibrated.
The first area to come under pressure is Nasdaq and AI growth stocks.
But the issue does not remain confined to technology stocks. Real estate, financials, utilities, industrials, and consumer sectors must all recalculate their cost of capital.
The market is now beginning to look less at growth rates and more at cash-flow quality and duration.
Prologue: Long-Term Yields Are Becoming the Market’s Reference Price Again
The figures confirmed again in the U.S. bond market at the end of May 2026 were simple. The 10-year Treasury yield had climbed to around 4.45%, and the 30-year Treasury yield had risen to around 4.98%. According to FRED, on May 28, 2026, the 10-year Treasury yield (DGS10) was 4.45%, and the 30-year Treasury yield (DGS30) was 4.98%. The 30-year yield crossed back above the 5% line in mid-May, recording 5.18% on May 19 and 5.11% on May 20.
These figures do not simply mean that “rates are high.” More precisely, they mean that the market has begun applying a higher discount rate again to distant future cash flows. During the zero-rate period of 2020, even far-off growth could receive a high price. But near a 10-year yield of 4.5% and a 30-year yield of 5%, the story changes. Future revenue, future earnings, future productivity, and future AI monetization all face stronger present-value discount pressure.
The reason Nasdaq is exposed to this pressure first is simple. Nasdaq’s core assets have long duration. Their prices are attached more to future growth rates, future margins, and future market dominance than to cash currently being generated. When rates rise, these assets shake first. But the core argument of this report does not stop there. Rising long-term yields are not only a technology-stock problem. When the cost of capital rises, every industry is revalued.
Real estate is pressured by borrowing costs. Utilities are pressured by infrastructure investment costs. Industrials must recalculate capital expenditure and inventory-financing costs. Consumer companies must pass through the interest burden borne by consumers. Financials may appear to benefit from higher rates in the short term, but if a surge in long-term yields is accompanied by credit risk and asset-value adjustments, the story changes. The renewed rise in long-term yields is not a negative factor for a single sector. It is a variable that realigns the pricing system of the entire market.
Executive Summary: The Core Judgment of This Report
The core judgment of this Full System View Report is that the renewed rise in U.S. long-term yields first appears through Nasdaq duration risk, but the actual shock can spread across all industries. Until now, the market has justified high valuations through the earnings momentum of AI, semiconductors, and mega-cap technology stocks. But when long-term yields rise again, the market’s question changes. “How much will it grow?” becomes less important than “What is that growth worth in present value?”
A Societe Generale model cited by Reuters views a 10-year Treasury yield of 4.5% as a threshold where the burden on the equity market increases. In the same report, SocGen estimated ERP at 3.5%, while JPMorgan estimated it at 2.2%. This means equities are approaching a zone where they may not provide enough risk compensation relative to safe assets.
In this zone, the market calculates two things at the same time. First, how much further AI and mega-cap technology stocks can lift earnings. Second, how much the rise in long-term yields and term premiums cuts into the present value of those earnings. If the former is faster, the rally can continue. If the latter is faster, valuation compression begins.
[System View 3-Point Summary]
- First, the core of the renewed rise in long-term yields is not the policy rate, but long-term real rates and the term premium.
- Second, Nasdaq reacts first to rising rates because it is highly dependent on distant future cash flows.
- Third, this pressure can spread beyond technology into real estate, financials, industrials, utilities, and consumer sectors.
01. What the 10-Year at 4.5% and the 30-Year at 5% Are Saying
The repricing of the long end matters more than the policy rate
It is insufficient to interpret this renewed rise in long-term yields simply as a problem caused by the Fed not cutting rates enough. The key is the long end of the curve. Short-term rates are more directly tied to the central bank’s policy path. By contrast, the 10-year and 30-year yields reflect the market’s view of long-term inflation, fiscal deficits, Treasury supply, real growth, and the term premium all at once.
According to FRED, the 10-year Treasury yield was near 4.5% at the end of May 2026, while the 30-year yield was approaching the 5% line. The fact that the 30-year yield crossed above 5% again is especially important. The 30-year yield reflects long-term confidence more than short-term business-cycle conditions. It means long-term investors are demanding higher compensation to hold long-dated U.S. government bonds.
Fiscal concerns sit behind this. The CBO projected the U.S. federal deficit at around $1.9 trillion and projected that debt held by the public could rise to 118% of GDP by 2035. The long-bond market does not ignore these numbers. When Treasury supply increases, inflation uncertainty remains, and geopolitical risk exists at the same time, long-term investors demand higher yields.
The Fed’s Financial Stability Report also pointed out that asset valuations remain elevated and that risk premiums can be repriced during periods of volatility. In other words, the market is not only looking at the level of rates. It is looking at the combination of high valuations and high long-term yields existing at the same time.
[System View Data] Key Levels Behind the Renewed Rise in U.S. Long-Term Yields
| Indicator | Latest Confirmed Figure | System View Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. 10-Year Treasury Yield | 4.45% 2026-05-28 |
The reference point for the equity-market discount rate. Around 4.5%, the valuation room for growth stocks narrows. From this zone, the market scrutinizes cash-flow durability more strictly than earnings growth alone. |
| U.S. 30-Year Treasury Yield | 4.98% 2026-05-28 |
The segment reflecting long-term inflation, fiscal burden, and term premium. Around 5%, long-term capital costs begin to pressure the entire market again. |
| 30-Year Yield Rebreaks 5% | 5.18% 2026-05-19 |
A signal that long-bond investors are demanding higher compensation. This is not a simple rate fluctuation, but a repricing of the U.S. long-term fiscal and inflation path. |
| CBO Fiscal Outlook | Debt/GDP 118% Forecast |
Fiscal deficits and Treasury supply pressure are factors that raise the floor for long-term yields. The market no longer views long-dated Treasuries only as unconditional safe assets. Supply pressure is reflected in price. |
* Based on FRED DGS10·DGS30, CBO fiscal outlook, and publicly available data as of late May 2026. Part 1 focuses on long-term yield levels and market interpretation.
02. Why Rising Long-Term Yields Threaten Every Industry
Nasdaq reacts first, but the discount rate applies to the entire market
Rising long-term yields can easily look like a Nasdaq problem. In practice, the first areas to come under pressure are large growth stocks, AI infrastructure, high-multiple software, and companies whose prices are attached to long-term growth. But this is only the first reaction. Discount rates do not apply only to one industry. Every company that uses capital is affected by long-term yields.
When rates rise, three things happen at the same time. First, corporate borrowing costs increase. Second, the present value of future cash flows declines. Third, investors must demand higher risk compensation for holding equities. The problem becomes more serious when stock prices are already high. When the risk-free rate rises while stock prices are high, the excess compensation offered by equities becomes thin.
Reuters recently cited market commentary identifying the 10-year yield at 4.5% as a major level where the burden on equities increases. The same context also confirms that ERP has declined. SocGen estimated ERP at 3.5%, while JPMorgan estimated it at 2.2%. The absolute level of the numbers matters less than the direction. Long-term yields are high, equity valuations are high, and risk compensation has narrowed.
This combination pressures every industry in different ways. Technology stocks face valuation compression. Real estate and REITs face higher funding costs and pressure from alternative yields. Utilities may look like stable-cash-flow industries, but they must absorb higher financing costs for large-scale infrastructure investment. Industrials face longer capital-expenditure payback periods, and consumer companies must pass through household interest burdens and weaker credit conditions. Financials can benefit in part through net interest margins, but if surging long-term yields bring credit risk and asset-price adjustments, they are not defensive assets.
Therefore, the “Nasdaq duration risk” discussed in this report is not only a technology-stock problem. Nasdaq is closer to a leading indicator that shows discount-rate stress across the entire market. High-growth technology stocks shake first. Then industries vulnerable to capital costs are revalued. Finally, companies with weak cash-flow quality and high debt dependence are separated from those that can withstand the higher cost of capital.
[System View Data] How Rising Long-Term Yields Transmit Across Industries
| Industry | First-Order Pressure | System View Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Nasdaq·AI Growth Stocks | Future cash-flow discounting, multiple compression | These are long-duration assets and therefore react first. Even with strong earnings, stock prices become heavy if the discount rate rises faster. |
| Real Estate·REITs | Higher borrowing costs, pressure from alternative yields | When risk-free yields rise, rental yields become less attractive. Assets with weak debt-maturity structures come under pressure first. |
| Utilities·Power Infrastructure | Higher CapEx funding costs | AI power demand is positive, but the payback period is long. When rates are high, even stable cash flows are discounted. |
| Industrials·Manufacturing | Longer capital-expenditure payback periods | Even if demand holds, higher capital costs slow new investment decisions. ROIC becomes more important than revenue growth. |
| Consumer·Retail | Household interest burden, weaker credit conditions | When rates stay high, consumers respond less to price and more to monthly payment burdens. The issue shifts from revenue growth to margin defense. |
| Financials·Banks | Collision between net interest margin and credit risk | Higher rates are not always favorable for financial stocks. If surging long-term yields trigger credit stress and asset-price adjustments, credit costs become the core variable. |
03. Why the Market Looks at Nasdaq First
Long-duration assets react first to changes in the discount rate
Nasdaq is sensitive to long-term yields not simply because it contains many technology stocks. More precisely, Nasdaq’s core assets have long duration. Here, duration is not the bond concept of maturity. It means how much a company’s value depends on distant future cash flows.
Companies with large near-term cash flows can withstand rate increases to some extent because current cash explains a significant portion of their price. By contrast, companies whose prices are mostly explained by future growth rates and terminal value are more sensitive to discount-rate changes. When rates rise by 50bp or 100bp, the present value of distant cash flows declines more sharply.
This is why the AI rally cannot be viewed simplistically. It is hard to deny that AI is creating real demand. But market prices are not determined by demand alone. Even if demand is strong, if that demand is valued as distant future cash flow while the discount rate rises at the same time, the present value comes under pressure. The uploaded research points to the same issue. The current market has entered a zone where “the speed at which AI justifies earnings” is competing against “the speed at which long-term yields and real rates cut into valuations.”
This is where popular interpretation and market interpretation diverge. The public tends to think, “If earnings are good, the stock price rises.” Capital markets see it differently. Even if earnings are strong, if those earnings are already embedded in the price and long-term yields force a higher discount rate, the stock price may fail to rise further. This is the starting point of Nasdaq duration risk.
The conclusion of this section is simple. Rising long-term yields have not yet reached a stage where we can declare that the market has collapsed. But the pricing standard has changed. The zero-rate market of 2020–2021 paid high prices for distant growth. The 2026 market demands a lower multiple even when buying the same growth. That difference is the pressure now sitting on Nasdaq and on the valuations of all industries.
04. Why Has the Equity Risk Premium Become Thin?
Higher rates do not immediately break equities. The issue is compensation.
Rising long-term yields do not mean the equity market must fall immediately. If rates rise because of strong growth expectations, corporate earnings growth can partially offset the increase in discount rates. In fact, the 2026 market has been sustained by this force. AI infrastructure investment, mega-cap earnings, and semiconductor profit expectations have pushed the upper end of stock prices higher.
But the problem begins here. Equities are riskier than safe assets. Therefore, investors demand higher expected returns than Treasuries in exchange for holding equities. This difference is the equity risk premium, or ERP. When ERP is ample, the market can withstand rising rates. Conversely, when ERP has already become thin and long-term yields rise further, equities no longer provide sufficient compensation.
This is the core of the recent market. Stock prices are high. Long-term yields are also high. Then the remaining risk compensation in between becomes thin. According to market commentary cited by Reuters, Societe Generale viewed the 10-year Treasury yield at 4.5% as a level where the burden on equities increases, and estimated ERP at around 3.5%. JPMorgan’s estimate was even lower at 2.2%. The absolute level of the numbers matters less than the direction. The excess compensation investors receive for holding equities is shrinking.
The Fed sent a similar signal. In its May 2026 Financial Stability Report, the Fed assessed that equity premiums were below their historical averages. This is not simply another way of saying the market is expensive. It means that because risky-asset prices are high while safe-asset yields are also high, the equity market’s margin of safety has narrowed.
[System View Data] The Core Structure of ERP Pressure
| Indicator or View | Recent Signal | System View Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| 10-Year Treasury Yield | Around 4.5% | The benchmark line for the equity-market discount rate. If this level persists, the acceptable price range for high-multiple assets narrows. |
| SocGen ERP Estimate | Approx. 3.5% | A signal that equity risk compensation is not generous. Near a 10-year yield of 4.5%, equity multiple pressure increases. |
| JPMorgan ERP Estimate | Approx. 2.2% | A tighter interpretation. In this case, the equity market has little room to absorb an additional rate increase. |
| Fed Financial Stability Assessment | Below historical average | The official institution has effectively acknowledged that equity premiums are low. High stock prices and high long-term yields coexist. |
ERP pressure works through two channels. The first is the denominator effect. When the risk-free rate rises, the discount rate used in corporate valuation rises. The same cash flow receives a lower present value. The second is the alternative-asset effect. If Treasuries provide yields around 4.5%, investors demand higher compensation from equities. But if stock prices have already risen, that compensation can only be restored through price declines or multiple compression.
This is why the phrase “stocks are holding up despite higher rates” must be read carefully. It may mean the market is strong. But there is another possible interpretation. Earnings expectations may be barely offsetting the increase in discount rates, while the margin of safety becomes thinner. The current market is increasingly reflecting the latter risk.
05. The Discount Rate Pressures Nasdaq First
High-growth stocks are assets that pull distant future cash flows into today’s price
Nasdaq is sensitive to long-term yields not because its companies are simply “technology stocks.” More precisely, its price structure is long. More value is attached to future growth rates, future margins, and future market dominance than to current earnings. Assets with this structure are sensitive to changes in the discount rate.
Equity duration is not a concept with a fixed maturity like bond duration. But it is a useful framework for showing how much corporate value depends on distant future cash flows. For growth stocks, long-term growth rates and terminal value matter more than near-term cash flows. That is why rising rates shake the present value of growth stocks more strongly.
Goldman Sachs’ published analysis shows this issue intuitively. According to Reuters, Goldman estimated that about 75% of the total value of the S&P 500 comes from terminal value beyond 10 years. It also analyzed that if the long-term growth-rate assumption falls by 1 percentage point, the total value of the S&P 500 could decline by about 15%.
This number is important. If the S&P 500 as a whole already has such long duration, Nasdaq and AI-related high-growth stocks must be even more sensitive. No matter how strong the AI rally is, if a large portion of its value is tied to post-2030 cash flows, it cannot be free from discount-rate changes.
[System View Data] Duration-Sensitivity Proxy for Large Growth Stocks
| Stock | P/E | Earnings Yield | Duration Proxy | Impact of 100bp Discount-Rate Rise |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft | 26.8x | 3.73% | 26.8 years | -26.8% |
| NVIDIA | 32.1x | 3.11% | 32.1 years | -32.1% |
| Amazon | 32.4x | 3.09% | 32.4 years | -32.4% |
| Meta | 23.0x | 4.35% | 23.0 years | -23.0% |
| Alphabet | 29.0x | 3.45% | 29.0 years | -29.0% |
| Apple | 37.8x | 2.65% | 37.8 years | -37.8% |
* This table is not an exact fair-value calculation, but a valuation-only sensitivity proxy. Because P/E is used as an approximate duration measure, actual stock-price reactions can vary depending on EPS changes, ERP changes, positioning, buybacks, and other factors.
The table above should not be interpreted literally. A 100bp increase in rates does not mechanically mean Microsoft falls 26.8%. In the real market, earnings upgrades, buybacks, positioning, liquidity, and investor sentiment operate together. But the direction is clear. The more expensive an asset is, the more vulnerable it is to rate changes. In particular, companies with low earnings yields and high dependence on long-term growth assumptions face discount-rate pressure first.
The important point here is to distinguish between “a good company” and “a good stock.” Companies such as Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Alphabet have real cash flow and market dominance. But even a good company can be assigned a lower multiple in a high-discount-rate environment. The issue is not corporate quality alone. The issue is price.
06. The AI Rally Creates Earnings, but Interest Rates Decide Present Value
Even strong demand becomes heavy when discount rates rise
It is inaccurate to view the AI rally as a simple bubble. The current AI cycle includes real revenue, real CapEx, and real EPS upgrades. Goldman Sachs has assessed that AI infrastructure companies are making a large contribution to 2026 S&P 500 EPS growth, and that AI-related CapEx is a core pillar supporting equity-market earnings expectations.
However, the fact that AI creates earnings and the question of what price should be paid for those earnings are different issues. The market is now beginning to separate the two. AI demand is strong. But the speed at which that demand converts into actual cash flow, and the discount rate applied when that cash flow is converted into present value, have become more important.
Goldman’s terminal-value analysis shows this issue. If roughly 75% of the S&P 500’s value depends on cash flows beyond 10 years, the market is already paying a high price for distant future growth. In this structure, even a small reduction in the long-term growth-rate assumption can significantly reduce value. According to Goldman analysis cited by Reuters, if the long-term growth-rate assumption falls by 1 percentage point, the total value of the S&P 500 could decline by about 15%.
AI-related stocks are more sensitive to this issue. The market does not price AI companies only on this year’s earnings. It prices in post-2030 market dominance, data-center demand, cloud monetization, software productivity, and ad-efficiency improvements in advance. These expectations may prove correct. But when rates rise, the same expectations receive a lower price today.
[System View Framework] The Competition Between the AI Rally and Long-Term Yields
| Variable | Positive Interpretation | Risk Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| AI Infrastructure CapEx | Real demand and real capital expenditure exist. This is not simply a theme; it is being reflected in corporate earnings. | As CapEx grows, ROI verification pressure also increases. When rates are high, long-payback investments are assessed more strictly. |
| Mega-Cap Earnings | Companies with cash flow and pricing power can withstand high-rate funding costs relatively well. | Even good companies cannot escape discount-rate pressure at expensive prices. EPS can rise while multiples decline. |
| Terminal Value | If AI raises long-term productivity, distant future cash flows can truly increase. | If a large share of value lies beyond 10 years, it is vulnerable to changes in long-term yields and growth-rate assumptions. |
| Long-Term Yields | If rates rise because of strong growth expectations, the market can absorb part of the increase. | If rates rise because of inflation, fiscal concerns, and term premium, valuation pressure becomes much larger. |
Therefore, it is insufficient to frame the current market only as “AI bubble or not.” The more precise question is this: can AI earnings upgrades outrun long-term yield and ERP pressure? If the answer is positive, Nasdaq can hold up longer. If the answer turns negative, valuation compression can proceed quickly.
So far, AI earnings have withstood rising discount rates. But withstanding pressure is not the same as being safe. Near a 10-year yield of 4.5% and a 30-year yield of 5%, the market no longer pays unlimited prices for distant future growth. Companies with strong earnings and companies with only strong narratives are being separated. This separation becomes even more important in the next section because long-term yields do not merely pressure Nasdaq multiples. They change the capital-allocation standard for AI infrastructure investment and every industry.
07. Long-Term Yields Change Corporate Investment Decisions Again
Capital payback comes before revenue growth
Part 2 confirmed the issue in stock-market pricing. ERP has become thin, discount rates are rising, and Nasdaq’s long duration is the first to come under pressure. But the impact of rising long-term yields does not end with equity multiples. The deeper issue is corporate investment judgment.
When rates are low, companies can more easily justify distant future cash flows. Capital expenditure, data centers, factories, power grids, logistics centers, R&D, and M&A all follow the same principle. When the cost of capital is low, even projects with long payback periods can be approved. Conversely, when long-term yields rise, the same projects struggle to pass internal return thresholds.
At this point, the market does not look only at growth rates. It does not merely ask whether revenue is increasing. It asks how much capital must be spent to obtain that revenue, and how many years later that capital returns as cash. In an environment where the 10-year yield is around 4.5% and the 30-year yield is around 5%, “it will grow someday” is no longer enough. Investors demand faster monetization, higher ROIC, and lower debt dependence.
This change is most visible in AI, but it is not only an AI problem. Data centers require power grids and cooling facilities. Power grids require power plants and transmission infrastructure. Manufacturing requires automation equipment and inventory financing. Real estate must pass through refinancing costs. Utilities must recalculate the recovery structure of long-term investment costs. When long-term yields rise, investment projects in all industries face the same question.
When does this investment actually come back as cash?
[System View Data] How Rising Long-Term Yields Affect Corporate Investment Decisions
| Transmission Channel | Change Inside the Company | Result in Market Pricing |
|---|---|---|
| Higher Borrowing Costs | Corporate bond issuance, project finance, and CapEx funding costs rise. | Valuations fall first for companies with high debt dependence. Interest expense reacts before earnings. |
| Higher Hurdle Rate | The internal return threshold required for new investments rises. | Growth projects slow. The market demands ROIC rather than revenue growth. |
| Payback-Period Pressure | Projects with clear short-term cash flows are prioritized over long-term projects. | Companies with current cash flows are relatively defended compared with companies priced on distant future growth. |
| More Conservative Capital Allocation | M&A, large-scale CapEx, and long-term R&D budgets are reviewed again. | The market assigns higher value to growth narratives less, and to free cash flow, dividends, buybacks, and debt-management ability more. |
In this structure, the most vulnerable companies are not simply growth stocks. More precisely, they are companies that use a lot of capital, have long payback periods, and depend more on future assumptions than current cash flows. Conversely, companies that can withstand high rates have pricing power, low debt burden, fast monetization, and high ROIC.
Therefore, in a rising long-term yield environment, the market’s question changes. It is no longer “Is this industry growing?” but “Does this industry’s growth convert into cash flow that remains for shareholders?” If this difference is not distinguished, investors can select the wrong assets even within the same growth industry.
08. AI Infrastructure Investment Is the First Test of High Rates
Demand is strong, but the payback period is long
AI infrastructure investment is the area where the impact of rising long-term yields appears most clearly. The market already knows AI demand exists. Cloud companies are building data centers, semiconductor companies are supplying GPUs and networking equipment, and power companies have begun reflecting data-center load. The issue is not demand, but investment recovery.
AI infrastructure investment is not an asset-light model. It requires servers, GPUs, networking equipment, power facilities, cooling systems, land, construction costs, and transmission-grid connections. This investment remains as CapEx on the accounting side, and later enters the income statement as depreciation, electricity costs, maintenance costs, and financing costs. When rates are low, this can be explained by future monetization. But when rates are high, investors ask more quickly. When will this infrastructure begin generating cash?
The positive logic of AI infrastructure investment is clear. Real demand exists. AI-related revenue at cloud operators is increasing, and enterprise productivity adoption is also underway. Semiconductors and networking equipment have earnings attached to them. Therefore, it is excessive to view this cycle as simply identical to the dot-com bubble.
But in a high-rate environment, the opposite question cannot be avoided. CapEx goes out first, while cash flow comes in later. When long-term yields rise, the cost of this time gap increases. In particular, if AI infrastructure investment expands beyond the level that a few mega-caps can sufficiently cover with internal cash flow and moves into external borrowing, long-term power contracts, and large-scale real estate and infrastructure development, interest-rate sensitivity becomes even higher.
[System View Data] High-Rate Vulnerabilities in AI Infrastructure Investment
| Cost Item | Change in a High-Rate Environment | System View Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| GPU·Server Purchases | Large upfront investment is required, and the technology replacement cycle is fast. | As the economic useful life of silicon shortens, depreciation burden grows. High rates force this cost to be assessed more strictly. |
| Data-Center Construction | Land, construction costs, cooling facilities, and long-term power contracts accompany the project. | AI investment is not a software cost; it is an infrastructure cost. The longer the payback period, the more sensitive it becomes to long-term yields. |
| Power Grid·Cooling Infrastructure | Rising power demand is positive, but investment costs occur first. | For power infrastructure, the bottlenecks are permits, transmission-grid queues, and construction timelines, not demand. Rates increase the cost of this bottleneck. |
| External Borrowing·Corporate Bonds | Investments that cannot be covered with internal cash alone require debt financing. | Higher interest expense raises the ROI hurdle. Even if AI demand is strong, the equity market discounts it if monetization speed is slow. |
This is why the core of the AI investment cycle is not demand. Demand has already been confirmed to a considerable degree. The core is monetization speed. What matters is how quickly AI infrastructure converts into cloud revenue, advertising efficiency, coding productivity, enterprise subscription fees, and cost reduction. If this conversion speed beats the rise in long-term yields, the market holds. If monetization is slow and long-term yields remain high, the market lowers multiples first.
At this point, the AI industry divides into two groups. First, platform companies that already have massive cash flows and customer bases and can absorb investment internally. Second, companies that depend more heavily on future growth and external financing. In a high-rate environment, the gap between these two groups widens.
09. Power-Grid and Infrastructure Bottlenecks Are Not a Growth Problem, but a Recovery Problem
Even if demand exists, revenue is delayed if it cannot be physically built
Rising long-term yields do not operate only inside financial markets. When they meet physical infrastructure, the problem becomes more complex. AI data centers, semiconductor fabs, power grids, transmission facilities, cooling infrastructure, and logistics facilities all require time. Even if money is available, they cannot be completed immediately.
This physical bottleneck has two faces. On one hand, it acts as a buffer that slows oversupply. If data centers are not built all at once, it can prevent rental rates and compute prices from collapsing. On the other hand, it is a cost that delays monetization. Equipment, land, and contracts are secured first, while revenue comes later. When rates are high, the cost of this time gap increases.
The power grid is a representative example. AI data centers consume a lot of electricity. Rising power demand can be positive for utilities and power-infrastructure companies. But power plants, transmission grids, transformers, local permits, and long-term power contracts all take time. Investors must look not simply at demand growth, but at the recovery structure.
When long-term yields are low, utilities and infrastructure companies can justify long-term projects relatively easily because they have stable cash flows. But when long-term yields rise toward 5%, the story changes. Even stable cash flows are valued with a higher discount rate. If regulated returns do not rise sufficiently, investment costs increase and shareholder returns decline.
[System View Data] The Two-Sided Market Effects of Physical Bottlenecks
This structure has important implications for utilities and infrastructure sectors. AI power demand is clearly a growth factor. But not all power companies receive the same benefit. Companies with favorable regulatory structures, the ability to pass investment costs into tariffs, and controllable borrowing costs can withstand this environment. Conversely, companies whose investment costs rise first while tariff recovery is delayed cannot easily avoid the pressure of rising long-term yields.
Therefore, power-grid and infrastructure bottlenecks are not simply a growth narrative. They are a capital-recovery problem. Even if AI demand exists, if power grids are delayed, investment costs rise, and payback periods lengthen, the market values that growth at a lower multiple.
10. ROI Verification Spreads Across Every Industry
The higher rates are, the more the market focuses on incremental returns rather than growth
The most important word in a rising long-term yield environment is ROI. When rates were low, the market was more tolerant of growth. If revenue grew quickly, it waited even if breakeven was delayed. But in a high-rate zone, waiting has a cost. While investors wait, Treasuries provide yields in the mid-to-high 4% range. Then equities must provide a clearer reason to be held.
ROI verification is not demanded only of AI companies. Real estate developers must recalculate returns on new projects. Manufacturers must reassess the payback period of capital expenditure. Consumer companies must prove whether marketing costs return as actual pricing power. Financials must prove credit costs and capital ratios rather than loan growth alone. Utilities must show whether investment costs can be recovered through regulated returns.
The market now looks at incremental returns more than absolute growth rates. Even if revenue rises, if more capital must be invested to create that growth, debt increases, and margins decline, the stock is unlikely to receive a high valuation. Conversely, even if revenue growth is low, companies with stable cash flows, low capital intensity, and pricing power have stronger defensive capacity.
[System View Data] ROI Verification Points by Industry
| Industry | Proof the Market Demands | Risk Signal |
|---|---|---|
| AI·Cloud | Whether CapEx connects to revenue, margins, customer lock-in, and productivity gains | Investment keeps rising, but paid usage, ad pricing, and cloud-margin improvement do not follow |
| Semiconductors·Equipment | Whether customer CapEx is sustainable, and whether inventories and orders match real demand | Hyperscaler investment growth slows, equipment orders show gaps, or margins peak out |
| Power·Utilities | Whether investment costs can be recovered through tariffs and long-term contracts | CapEx increases, but regulated returns and tariff pass-through fail to keep pace |
| Real Estate·REITs | Whether higher refinancing costs can be offset through rent growth and occupancy | Cap rates rise, refinancing costs increase, and rent growth slows at the same time |
| Consumer·Retail | Whether price increases and cost cuts translate into actual margin defense | Revenue holds up, but promotional costs, financing costs, and inventory burdens weaken cash flow |
What this table says is simple. In a high-rate zone, every industry must pass ROI verification in its own way. AI companies must prove the monetization of infrastructure investment. Power companies must prove investment-cost recovery. Real estate must withstand refinancing costs. Consumer companies must defend margins. Financials must control credit costs.
Therefore, the statement that “all industries are threatened” does not mean every stock falls in the same way. More precisely, it means every industry faces the same question. Can this company generate enough cash flow to beat the higher cost of capital? Companies that cannot answer this question are the first to receive lower valuations.
Part 4 must therefore continue by examining how this pressure changes corporate financial structures and industry rankings. Rising long-term yields do not end as a simple macro variable. They create pressure that makes ROIC more important than ROE, monetization speed more important than growth rate, and dispersion between companies more important than industry averages.
11. The Market Is Moving from ROE to ROIC
High rates demand not merely asset-light companies, but companies that use capital efficiently
During the period of low long-term yields, ROE was one of the market’s main languages. How much profit does a company generate relative to shareholder equity? Platform companies, software companies, and Big Tech were strong under this standard. They could produce high ROE without holding large physical assets, and the market assigned high valuations to this structure.
But when long-term yields rise again, the question changes. Return on equity alone is not enough. What matters is how efficiently the company turns all invested capital, including both debt and equity, into cash flow. This standard is ROIC.
ROE can be raised through leverage. ROIC is colder. It asks how much operating profit a company generates relative to the capital it actually invested. When rates were low, debt-funded growth could be justified to some degree. When rates are high, the situation changes. Debt carries interest expense, and investments face higher hurdle rates. Then the market looks at capital efficiency before growth rates.
This change applies to every industry. Technology companies are moving away from asset-light models through massive AI infrastructure investment. Utilities must expand power-grid investment. Industrials must continue automation and reshoring investment. Real estate must pass through refinancing costs. Financials must manage credit costs and capital ratios. The form differs by industry, but the question narrows to one.
Can the capital invested generate returns higher than the higher interest-rate environment?
[System View Data] From an ROE-Centered Market to an ROIC-Centered Market
| Judgment Standard | Interpretation in a Low-Rate Market | Interpretation in a High-Rate Market |
|---|---|---|
| ROE | High profit relative to shareholder equity received a premium valuation. | ROE created through leverage becomes less reliable. Interest expense is tested first. |
| ROIC | Closer to a secondary metric. If growth was strong, low capital returns were tolerated. | It rises as the core judgment standard. Companies must prove returns higher than the elevated cost of capital. |
| FCF | Temporary cash-flow weakness was tolerated if future growth was strong. | Growth without cash flow is discounted. The market looks at actual free cash rather than accounting earnings. |
| CapEx | It was treated as upfront investment for growth. | Payback period and return are tested. Incremental return becomes more important than the size of investment. |
This transition is especially important for AI. In the past, Big Tech showed high ROE and high margins at the same time through asset-light models. But AI infrastructure investment requires servers, GPUs, power, cooling, real estate, and networking equipment. This partially turns software companies into infrastructure companies. Even if the market still views AI as a growth industry, if that growth requires more invested capital, the valuation standard must change.
Ultimately, in a high-rate zone, a good company is not simply a company that grows. It is a company that generates high returns on invested capital, leaves those returns as cash, and absorbs rising rates through customer pricing or productivity. If it fails this standard, even a company in a good industry can receive a lower multiple.
12. Industry Rankings Are Being Divided Again
Even within the same sector, companies that beat rates and companies pressured by rates separate
Rising long-term yields do not push entire industries in one direction. Even within the same industry, they widen the gap between companies. This is the most important change in the current market. In the past, capital flowed together if a company was attached to words such as AI, semiconductors, cloud, power, or infrastructure. But when rates rise, the market divides more finely.
Even among AI companies, platforms with existing cash flows and software companies with unclear monetization are valued differently. Even among semiconductor companies, companies with monopolistic supply chains and companies carrying inventory risk late in the cycle are different. Even among power companies, companies that can recover investment costs through regulated returns and companies that cannot are different. Even among financials, banks that control deposit costs and banks whose credit costs rise quickly produce different outcomes in the same rate environment.
Therefore, what is needed in this zone is company selection rather than sector selection. In a rising long-term yield environment, the statement “this industry is promising” is not enough. Even if an industry is promising, individual companies with weak capital structures, pricing power, cash flow, and investment payback periods can see their stock prices pressured.
[System View Data] Industry Ranking Reclassification in a High-Rate Zone
This reclassification explains both market gains and losses at the same time. Even if the index holds up, compression takes place underneath. A small number of high-quality companies maintain premiums, the middle group waits for earnings confirmation, and the vulnerable group quietly receives lower valuations. Even if the market appears to move sideways on the surface, capital continues to rotate underneath.
The most dangerous judgment here is to equate a theme with a company. A strong AI theme does not mean every AI-related company is strong. Rising power demand does not mean every utility receives the same benefit. In a high-rate zone, financial structure comes before theme.
13. The Same Thing Happens Inside Nasdaq
The market is not buying AI itself. It is leaving only AI that can beat rates.
Nasdaq duration risk does not mean the entire Nasdaq must collapse. More precisely, it means winners and losers inside Nasdaq become more clearly separated. As long-term yields rise, the market no longer treats all growth stocks as one group. It separates growth with cash flow from growth without cash flow.
The group with the strongest defensive capacity consists of platform companies that already have massive cash flows and customer bases. Even when AI investment costs rise, these companies can generate cash from existing businesses. Because they have foundational businesses such as cloud, advertising, subscriptions, operating systems, search, and enterprise software, they can absorb investment burdens to some extent even in a high-rate environment.
By contrast, the vulnerable group consists of companies with high prices attached to future growth but weak current cash flow. When rates were low, they could receive high valuations through distant future growth. But when rates rise, the market no longer grants long time horizons easily. The explanation that “it will monetize someday” loses power near a 30-year yield of 5%.
Semiconductor and AI infrastructure companies also require distinction. Companies with monopolistic technology and visible orders remain relatively strong. But companies exposed to demand slowdown, order adjustments, or customer CapEx cuts late in the cycle must be viewed differently. As long-term yields rise, customer investment plans are reviewed more strictly. If customers delay investment, the entire supply chain is affected.
[System View Data] Duration Separation Inside Nasdaq
| Group | Defensive Logic | Risk Condition |
|---|---|---|
| Mega-Cap Platforms | They generate cash flow from existing businesses and can absorb AI investment internally. | Multiples decline if AI investment costs damage existing-business FCF and cannot be passed through via pricing power. |
| AI Semiconductors·Networking | Real orders and earnings exist. They are first-order beneficiaries of the AI infrastructure investment cycle. | Stock prices react first if customer CapEx growth slows, margins peak out, or inventory adjustments appear. |
| High-Growth Software | AI adoption and productivity expectations can justify high valuations. | If monetization is slow, competition intensifies, and customer IT budgets decline, duration risk appears most strongly. |
| Unprofitable Growth Stocks | They can rebound sharply when rates fall and liquidity expands. | When long-term yields remain high, the present value of future growth is heavily discounted. Funding costs also rise at the same time. |
Ultimately, what matters in Nasdaq investing is not simply adjusting overall exposure. It is reducing duration inside Nasdaq. Even within technology stocks, companies with current cash flow, pricing power, short investment payback periods, and the ability to handle both buybacks and CapEx at the same time are relatively advantaged.
Conversely, companies that speak of high growth but have weak cash flow, heavy cost structures, and dependence on external financing are assigned lower prices. Rising long-term yields mean the market has begun to value time more expensively. Companies that need more time face stricter verification.
14. Winners and Losers by Industry Are Divided by Monetization Speed
What matters more than growth rate is the time it takes to convert into cash
The final effect of the renewed rise in long-term yields is not sector rotation, but a reassessment of monetization speed. The market no longer pays a high price simply for the phrase “a good industry.” It looks at how quickly that industry’s growth converts into corporate cash flow.
For example, power infrastructure can benefit from rising AI demand. But power-grid investment requires a long time. Permits, construction, transmission-grid connection, long-term contracts, and tariff recovery involve many stages. When long-term yields are high, this time becomes a cost. Therefore, the fact that power demand is increasing is not enough. The regulatory structure and contract structure that allow investment costs to be recovered are important.
Real estate is similar. Data-center real estate can look like a growth industry. But when borrowing costs rise and cap rates increase, asset values come under pressure. Even if leasing demand is strong, shareholder returns decline if refinancing costs and development costs cannot be overcome.
Consumer and retail companies also cannot avoid the impact of long-term yields. High rates increase consumers’ credit burden and raise corporate inventory-financing costs. In this zone, strong companies are those that can raise prices while demand holds, and absorb cost increases into margins. Weak companies maintain revenue, but cash flow declines as promotional costs and financing costs increase.
[System View Data] Monetization Speed and Rate Sensitivity by Industry
| Industry | Monetization Speed | Rate Sensitivity | Core Judgment Standard |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mega-Cap Platforms | Fast | Medium | FCF and pricing power |
| AI Infrastructure | Medium to slow | High | ROI relative to CapEx |
| Power·Utilities | Slow | High | Regulated returns and tariff pass-through |
| Real Estate·REITs | Medium | High | Refinancing costs and cap rates |
| Consumer·Retail | Fast to medium | Medium | Margin defense and inventory turnover |
The important point in this table is not to buy or sell a specific industry indiscriminately, but to identify which companies within each industry have monetization speed. The higher long-term yields are, the less the market waits. Companies with fast monetization are relatively defended, while companies with delayed monetization receive higher discount rates.
Ultimately, the core of the 2026 market is not growth rate. Growth rates are already reflected in many assets. The market now looks at how much capital that growth requires, how quickly it returns as cash, and whether it provides enough compensation above the higher risk-free rate.
Based on this structure, the question in Part 5 follows naturally. What scenario will the market follow near a 10-year yield of 4.5% and a 30-year yield of 5%? And under what conditions should investors enter or reduce exposure? The final section organizes this issue through Macro Scenario, Defense Logic, and Action Plan.
15. Macro Scenario: Three Possible Paths After the Renewed Rise in Long-Term Yields
The key is not the direction of rates, but why rates are moving
The renewed rise in long-term yields should not be reduced to a single conclusion. A 10-year yield near 4.5% does not always mean the equity market must collapse. A 30-year yield above 5% does not mean all risky assets should be reduced indiscriminately. What matters is the cause of the rate increase.
A rise in real rates driven by stronger growth expectations and a rise in long-term yields driven by inflation, fiscal deficits, Treasury supply, and term premium create entirely different market outcomes. The former can be partially absorbed by corporate earnings improvement. The latter directly pressures valuations. What makes the 2026 market uncomfortable is the latter.
Therefore, this zone is better viewed through three practical paths: an easing scenario, a base scenario, and a stress scenario. This distinction is not a prediction. It is a checkpoint. It is an operating framework to identify which direction the market is moving.
[System View Macro Scenario] U.S. Long-Term Yields and Nasdaq Duration Risk
| Scenario | Probability | Rate·Macro Conditions | Market Interpretation | Portfolio Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Easing Scenario | 25% | The 10-year stabilizes below 4.25%, and the 30-year stabilizes below 4.75%. Inflation re-deceleration and AI EPS upgrades continue at the same time. | ERP pressure eases, and the rally can expand again around AI and mega-caps. | Maintain exposure to AI platforms and high-quality growth stocks. However, manage concentration in specific names. |
| Base Scenario | 50% | The 10-year remains around 4.25–4.75%, and the 30-year remains near 4.8–5.0%. Earnings hold up, but the discount rate does not decline. | The equity market is closer to compression than a sharp crash. The index holds, but internally, duration reduction proceeds. | Focus on mega-cap quality and FCF leaders. Reduce low-profitability, high-multiple names. |
| Stress Scenario | 25% | The 10-year holds above 4.75%, or the 30-year remains above 5%. Inflation, fiscal concerns, oil prices, and geopolitical risks operate at the same time. | ERP compresses further and Nasdaq multiple derating proceeds. Assets priced on long-term growth assumptions shake first. | Reduce growth-stock duration. Defend with cash, ultra-short-term bonds, intermediate-duration bonds, and some value, energy, and financial exposure. |
* Probabilities are an operating framework. They are not absolute predictions, but reference lines for checking rate levels and market reactions.
The base scenario is the most important. The market does not have to crash to be risky. The more common risk is a structure where the index holds up while high-duration assets quietly derate internally. A small number of large platforms support the index, while high-multiple growth stocks and unprofitable companies underneath receive lower prices first.
In the stress scenario, long-term Treasuries may not serve as a perfect hedge. In a zone where long-term yields rise because of fiscal concerns, inflation, and term premium, equities and long-duration bonds can shake at the same time. In this case, defense should not rely on simply buying long bonds. It should combine cash, ultra-short-term bonds, intermediate-duration bonds, and selected real-asset or value exposures.
16. Defense Logic: Three Misconceptions the Public Easily Misses
Stocks holding up despite high rates is not the same as rate risk disappearing
There are common misunderstandings when looking at long-term yields and Nasdaq duration risk. Most people judge risk by short-term price movement. But discount-rate risk is not a one-day news event. When high rates persist, corporate investment decisions and the market’s required return gradually change.
[System View Defense Logic] Misconceptions to Avoid in a Long-Term Yield Regime
Q1. “If AI earnings are strong, do long-term yields really matter?”
They matter. Earnings are the numerator, and rates are the denominator. While AI earnings increase the numerator, long-term yields increase the denominator. The market watches which side moves faster. Even if earnings are strong, if they are already priced in and the discount rate rises faster, stock prices can become heavy.
Q2. “Isn’t rising long-term yield pressure only a technology-stock problem?”
No. Technology stocks only react first. Interest rates are the cost of capital for every industry. Real estate is affected through refinancing costs, utilities through infrastructure investment costs, industrials through capital-expenditure payback periods, consumer companies through household interest burdens, and financials through credit costs.
Q3. “If rates fall, should all growth stocks be bought again?”
The reason rates are falling must be examined. A rate decline accompanied by inflation stabilization and stable earnings is favorable to growth stocks. But if rates fall because of a sharp economic slowdown, quality growth is preferable to indiscriminate growth-stock buying. The cause of the rate move matters more than the direction alone.
17. Counter-Argument Check: Conditions Under Which This Logic Could Be Wrong
The stronger the conclusion, the more important it is to check the opposite conditions first
The core logic of this report is that the renewed rise in long-term yields pressures the cost of capital for Nasdaq and all industries. However, this logic is conditional. Markets do not always move in one direction. If the conditions below are confirmed, the defensive judgment in this report can weaken.
[System View Counter-Argument Check]
If these three conditions appear at the same time, the market can move favorably toward growth stocks again. Therefore, this report’s conclusion is not “Nasdaq is unconditionally dangerous.” The more accurate conclusion is that, at the current rate level, duration management is necessary even within growth stocks.
18. System View Risk Grade
The current zone requires selection more than aggression
[System View Risk Grade]
Risk Level: High
The current risk grade is High. The reason is clear. A 10-year yield around 4.5% and a 30-year yield near 5% make equity-market risk compensation thin and increase duration risk for Nasdaq and AI-related high-multiple assets. However, because AI earnings and mega-cap cash flows have not yet broken down, it is still too early to define the situation as Extreme. This is a zone that requires selection and concentration management rather than full retreat.
19. Exit & Entry Action Plan
The task is not abandoning growth stocks, but reducing time inside growth stocks
The necessary response in the current zone is not a simple sale of growth stocks or purchase of value stocks. The core is duration management. Completely eliminating Nasdaq and AI exposure is excessive. But it is also unreasonable to keep holding assets whose prices are explained only by long-term growth assumptions.
[System View Action] Portfolio Switching in a Renewed Long-Term Yield Rise
Response by Time Horizon
| Time Horizon | Core Judgment | Portfolio Response |
|---|---|---|
| Short Term 1–3 months |
Confirm the collision between rate levels and AI earnings momentum. Internal rotation matters more than the index level. | Reduce low-profitability growth stocks, maintain mega-cap quality exposure, and review cash and ultra-short-term bond allocation. |
| Medium Term 3–12 months |
Check the ROI of AI CapEx and company-level FCF defense. | Concentrate around companies with high ROIC, fast monetization, and the ability to pass through rising rates into pricing. |
| Long Term 1 year or more |
Confirm whether U.S. long-term yields remain structurally high. | Rebuild around companies with capital efficiency, debt management, cash flow, and dividend/buyback capacity rather than growth rate alone. |
Conclusion: The Market Is Pricing Time Back Into Growth
The renewed rise in U.S. long-term yields is not just rate news. It is a signal that the market’s price of time is changing. In the zero-rate and liquidity-driven market, even distant future growth could receive a high price. Now the structure is different. Near a 10-year yield of 4.5% and a 30-year yield of 5%, the cost of waiting for future cash flows increases.
This pressure appears first in Nasdaq. Nasdaq contains many assets with long duration. But the impact does not remain confined to technology. Long-term yields are the cost of capital for every industry. Real estate, power, industrials, consumer companies, and financials must all pass through the higher cost of capital.
Therefore, what is needed now is not abandoning growth stocks. It is reducing time inside growth stocks. Companies with current cash flow, pricing power, high returns on invested capital, and the ability to withstand rising long-term yields survive. Conversely, companies whose prices are maintained only by distant future growth assumptions are assigned lower multiples.
The market has not yet abandoned AI. But the market is not buying AI unconditionally either. The question has changed. It is no longer how much it grows. It is whether that growth returns as cash faster than the higher interest-rate environment.
[Conclusion Summary]
- The core of the renewed rise in U.S. long-term yields is not the policy rate, but long-term real rates and the term premium.
- A 10-year yield around 4.5% and a 30-year yield near 5% mark a zone where Nasdaq duration risk increases.
- Rising long-term yields pressure not only technology stocks, but also the cost of capital and investment payback periods across all industries.
- The market’s core standards now are FCF, ROIC, debt ratios, and monetization speed rather than growth rate alone.
- The rational portfolio approach is not “abandon AI completely,” but “duration down even within AI.”
Key Questions
Why do rising U.S. long-term yields burden Nasdaq?
Nasdaq contains many long-duration assets whose valuations depend heavily on future cash flows. When long-term yields rise, the present value of those future cash flows declines, increasing valuation pressure on high-multiple growth stocks.
Why is the 10-year Treasury yield at 4.5% important?
The 10-year yield around 4.5% is interpreted as a zone where the equity market’s risk compensation becomes thin. If this level persists, ERP pressure increases and growth-stock multiple expansion becomes limited.
Are rising long-term yields only a technology-stock problem?
No. Technology stocks react first, but long-term yields are the cost of capital for every industry. Real estate, utilities, industrials, consumer sectors, and financials must all recalculate borrowing costs and investment payback periods.
Can the AI rally continue despite rising long-term yields?
Yes, but AI earnings upgrades and monetization speed must move faster than the increase in discount-rate pressure. Even if AI demand is strong, valuation pressure rises if ROI verification is slow or long-term yields rise further.
What is the most important portfolio response now?
Duration management within growth stocks is more important than the growth-stock allocation itself. Investors should reduce high-multiple names with weak current cash flow and concentrate around quality companies with strong FCF, ROIC, and pricing power.
Sources and References
[1] FRED — Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 10-Year Constant Maturity (DGS10) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10
[2] FRED — Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 30-Year Constant Maturity (DGS30) — https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30
[3] Reuters — US bonds about to bite stocks — 2026-05-27 — https://www.reuters.com/commentary/reuters-open-interest/us-bonds-about-bite-stocks-2026-05-27/
[4] Reuters — Inflation challenges US Treasuries' traditional role in portfolios — 2026-05-28 — https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/inflation-challenges-us-treasuries-traditional-role-portfolios-2026-05-28/
[5] Federal Reserve — Financial Stability Report, May 2026 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20260508.pdf
[6] CBO — Budget and Long-Term Fiscal Outlook materials — https://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget
[7] Aswath Damodaran — Implied Equity Risk Premium data and methodology — https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
This article is not a recommendation to buy or sell any specific stock or asset. It is an analytical framework for investment reference only. All investment decisions and their outcomes are the sole responsibility of the investor. Market data and forecasts are based on the time of writing and may change depending on subsequent shifts in macroeconomic conditions, interest rates, earnings, policy, and geopolitical variables.
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